To What Extent did Deng Xiaoping set China on a new course in domestic and foreign policy after 1980?

            Deng Xiaoping’s emergence in the late 1970s as a prominent economic reformer marked China’s new era of reforms and positive changes. To a large extent, Deng Xiaoping’s domestic and foreign policies set China on a new course in many aspects; however, he also maintained a number of elements of his predecessors’ policies and ideologies during the early years of reform to provide a smooth transition and to create stability in China.

In 1980s, Deng’s domestic policies were not completely new and drastic; he started with rather moderate degrees of reforms probably because implementing too radical policies might create unnecessary instability and anxiety in China.  One of the first Chinese economy’s sectors to head on ‘the new course’ was the agricultural sector, which faced a series of policy changes after 1980.  Although decollectivization, abandonment of communes, and profit-driven incentives sound like very radical reforms, many characteristics of past policies remained.  For example, people were allowed to sell crops for profit –which was based on Deng’s idea that ‘poverty is not socialism’ and ‘getting rich is glorious’– but they needed to produce a certain amount of crops for the state and could not own farming lands. This ‘Household-responsibility system’ was able to maintain socialist concepts, such as producing for the state and land could not be owned privately, while encouraged people to produce more by generating more income.  China experienced a 3% growth in grain production (Lynch), better living standards of many families, and an overall economic growth.  Deng’s agricultural policies in early 1980s set China on a new course it had never experienced ever since the 1949 Revolution by gradually transitioning from what McGregor would call “old-fashioned state controls” to a more free market.

Deng’s belief in “radical pragmatism” also played a big part in setting China on a new course, especially in terms of economic policies.  According to Lynch, Deng had “urged that…a sense of realism ought to prevail”.  Ever since 1949, Chinese economic policies were based on theories and principles that never actually worked (the most prominent of these were the policies during ‘The Great Leap Forward’), so radical pragmatism was a completely new idea in China.  This was also one of the underlying beliefs that made Deng introduced reforms to modernize China in terms of science and technology, agriculture, industrialization, and defense.  Because State Owned Enterprises were usually inefficient, Deng’s policies gradually decreased state controls and allowed more private businesses, which were profit-driven and therefore had more efficiency. Deng’s economic reforms allowed the Chinese government to “extricate itself from a legacy of massive economic problems and … initiated a period of explosive economic growth” (Sung).   Deng’s economic policies resulted in an increase in privatization (in 1992 the private sector was larger than the public sector), increase in GNP and GDP, and overall economic growth certainly the started China on the new course.

On the contrary to his relatively economic and agricultural reforms, Deng insisted on maintaining the Chinese political structure: the socialist path, democratic dictatorship/centralism, leadership of CCP, and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology.  Although Deng encouraged the ideas of ‘emancipating the mind’ and ‘seeking truths from facts’, they were not explicitly political reforms but rather philosophical ones.  He emphasized that China was “striving for socialist modernizations, rather than other modernizations [bourgeois liberalization]” (Sullivan) so he was very assertive in upholding the ‘Four Cardinal Principles’, believing that these four principles were what characterized Chinese socialism that were preventing China from going onto the road of capitalism.  In terms of political structure, Deng did not set China on a new road but maintained the existing one instead because of his reluctance for political reform.

In terms of foreign policies, Deng started to open up to foreign nations and encouraged foreign investments in China, integrating China with the rest of the world like no other communist leader had.  Although Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong had established some good foreign relations, it was Deng who furthered those relations and used them to China’s economic advantages: foreign investments would lead to more capital and therefore more economic growth. His ‘Open Door’ policy was “inconsistent with Mao’s policies of self-sufficiency and market closure” (Sung) since Mao established foreign relations for the sake of political reasons rather than economic ones.  Deng’s “manner and glamour…changed traditional views of American people had for China” (quoted David Lampton, Song) during his travel to USA, where he successfully established diplomatic relations which is still prominent today. This success contributed largely to ‘Four Modernization’ campaign because China benefitted from the USA, and other western countries, in terms of trade, defense, education, technology, and science. He was significant in establishing China’s international status, something that previous leaders neglected to do.  Deng’s foreign policies started China’s emergence as an international superpower and had set China on a completely new course.

Deng’s policies overall set China on a new course: the socialist path with Chinese characteristics.  China after 1980 had a combination of communist ideology in politics and more liberal economic practices in agriculture and commerce.  Both his domestic and foreign policies facilitated China to emerge as a prosperous nation with massive international economic influence.  It can be said that he transformed China into what it is today, but it is also important to note that he maintained some aspects of previous policies during his initial reforms.

Word Count: 882

Bibliography:

"Deng Xiaoping (Chinese Leader) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 22 May 2011. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/157645/Deng-Xiaoping>.

"The Good Neighbor: Why China Cooperates | Harvard International Review | Find Articles at BNET." Find Articles at BNET | News Articles, Magazine Back Issues & Reference Articles on All Topics. Web. 22 May 2011. <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_3_29/ai_n29399468/>.

Lynch, Michael. The People's Republic of China since 1949. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2004. Print.

McGregor, Richard. The Party: the Secret World of China's Communist Rulers. New York, NY: Harper, 2010. Print.

Song, Farah. "Deng Xiaoping Boosts China's International Status." People's Daily Online. 5 Aug. 2004. Web. 21 May 2011. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200408/05/eng20040805_151945.html>.

Sullivan, Lawrence R. "Assault on the Reforms: Conservative Criticism of Political and Economic Liberalization in China, 1985-1986." JStor. The China Quarterly, June 1988. Web. 22 May 2011.

Sung, Soyoon. "Deng Xiaoping’s Dual Reformist Policies and the Ensuing Legitimacy Crisis."Duke East Asia Nexus. 31 Mar. 2008. Web. 22 May 2011.

"TIME Person of the Year: Story Archive Since 1927, Deng Xiaoping." Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs, News Photos, Video, Tech Reviews - TIME.com. 13 Dec. 2002. Web. 22 May 2011. <http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1985.html>.

Zagoria, Donald S. "China's Quiet Revolution | Foreign Affairs." 

Home | Foreign Affairs. Web. 22 May 2011. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/38516/donald-s-zagoria/chinas-quiet-re...>.

Josef Stalin has always been regarded by many as “the most evil man in history” given the fact that he had caused approximately 20 million lives (“How many did Stalin really Murder?”, 2006) both directly, such as the great Purge in 1936-1938, and indirectly, such as the Ukraine’s famine Holomodor in 1932-1933. Consequently, two important questions are raised regarding the origin of the Stalin’s so-called “Great Terror”: how did Stalin rise to power? And what helped him rise to power? Stalin political skills, personality, his opponents’ mistakes, and circumstances should be accounted for the causes of Stalin’s rise to power.

Some historians such as Graeme Gill suggest that what gave Stalin rise to power was his ability to “play the rules of political game…far more ably than his opponents” (Gill, 1998). In 1921, the communist party passed a law banning ‘factionalism’, which meant that any official who did not agree with the party’s policies could be expelled from the party, in an attempt to decrease time-consuming arguments among the party members. However, the resolution was actually a big loophole that allowed Stalin to accuse his opponents of factionalism, eliminating the competition and making way to his rise to power. For example, when Trotsky openly criticized the Soviet government’s economic policies and claimed that Stalin’s supporters abuse their powers in 1923, Stalin took this opportunity to accuse him of factionalism and succeeded in the first step of eliminating Trotsky from the list of influential people in the communist party. Moreover, Stalin formed strong alliances, such as the ‘troika’ which was consisted of him, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, in an attempt to eliminate his rivals. Once his rivals were weakened, he would turn against his own allies and eliminated them too, which left him the only prominent leader of the communist party by 1925. During this power struggle within the communist party, Stalin was able to maintain moderate composure and avoid getting into vulnerable political position.

Stalin was also skillful in securing his power in the Soviet Communist Party by “generating political support” (Gill, 1998) which ranged from supporters in the local to the politburo level. The system of the Soviet Communist Party gradually became more centralized after the Russian Revolution in 1917, giving few elite officers, also known as the politburo, the ultimate power to make important decisions on how to run the Soviet Union. In 1922, Stalin was appointed the General Secretary, an influential post which allowed him to appoint other positions in the party. In the 20’s, a period in which the number of communist party members increased rapidly, Stalin used his influence and power to recruit new members that were mostly inexperienced and poorly educated, whom less than 8% of the party members received secondary school education (Whittock, 1998). Stalin probably recruited this particular type of people intentionally as they were more obedient to him and therefore, easier to manipulate and control. Furthermore, these new recruits would feel beholden and were obliged to follow Stalin’s instructions since he was the one who gave them communist party membership, which was perceived as prestigious and honorable. These loyal supporters created a strong and secure power base for Stalin, which he later used to maintain his power. Appointing poorly-educated young men so that he could control them later was one of many smart political actions which gave him major advantages over his opponents. 

In addition to his political skills, Stalin’s ruthlessness played a major part in his rising and maintaining power, especially during the Great Purge (1936-38) which allowed him to eliminate communist party elites, military officers, kulaks, oppositions, and ethnic minorities. Stalin used the 1934 assassination of Sergei Kirov, a well-regarded Bolshevik leader, as an excuse to carry out the Great Purge, claiming that it would prevent future sabotage and espionage which threatened USSR. In reality, however, he used it as a way to eliminate his competition, suppress Russians in fear and terror, and make sure his oppositions were “doomed to…subsequent moral and physical annihilation”(“Khrushchev’s Secret Speech”, 1956). His ruthless personality help securing his power and making sure that nobody could challenge him. Stalin established himself as a ruthless leader who would not hesitate to eliminate his oppositions even if they were his own comrades, a fact which terrified government officials and citizens alike, thus allowing him to maintain his absolute power. This use of terror was proven to be successful in helping with Stalin’s rise to power and his retaining of power until his death, given that the Great Purge alone caused approximately one million lives and yet there was not a single uprising powerful enough to overthrow him, indicating how much people feared him.

Another cause of Stalin’s rise to power was his opponents, mainly Trotsky, who were unable to weaken Stalin and made several mistakes in the game of politics. Although Trotsky was highly respected by Russians and was intimidating the other elite members of the Communist Party, he took many missteps which eventually led to his own downfall. He could have gained a lot of power and influence if he accepted the offer for Deputy Chairman of Council People’s Commissars but he declined the offer. This meant that he had a weaker power base in the communist party than Stalin, who was the Commissar of Nationalities and had a lot of power in his hands. Not only that, he also declined the offer to deliver a speech to the Party Congress as representative of Lenin, whose body was too weak and too ill to deliver it himself, in 1923. As a result, Trotsky missed the chance to attack Stalin in Lenin’s place and to present himself as a promising leading member of the party. Stalin, on the other hand, did not let this chance of building his influence in the Congress slip by. Trotsky failed to attack Stalin on many occasions and when he did, his choice of method was unwise. In 1921, Stalin invaded Georgia in an attempt to make it a ‘subordinate’ to Soviet Russia. Lenin disagreed with the policy and asked Trotsky to investigate the 1922 Georgian Affair. However, not only had Trotsky failed to do so, he also had not even attend the debate, which offered him a great opportunity to attack Stalin. He decided to attack Stalin through opened letter instead, an unwise act which allowed Stalin to accuse him of factionalism.

Not only had his opponents’ failure made him stronger, the delay in publishing Lenin’s Testament, which was officially published many years after Stalin’s death, was a circumstantial factor which led to Stalin’s successful rise to power. After Lenin’s death, the leading members of the communist party felt that Lenin’s Testament should not be officially published. This is mainly because Lenin criticized every leading party member in it and made it hard for all to righteously claim the position of the leader. For example, Lenin said that Stalin was “too rude” and that he should not be the Commissar of Nationalities and Trotsky was mentioned as being egotistical. Zinoviev and Kamenev were accused of having “lack of enthusiasm for revolution” while Bukharin was labeled as “not fully Marxist” (Whittock, “Stalin’s Russia”). Although the leading members disagreed about several things, they all agreed upon not publishing Lenin’s Testament in the hope that they would be able to succeed Lenin. The decision has proven to be one of the causes to Stalin’s rise to power because Lenin’s Testament, if it were to be published right after his death, could potentially stop Stalin from rising to power because other party members would believe Lenin’s words that Stalin should not be in powerful positions.

In conclusion, Stalin’s rise to power is the result of his ruthlessness, his political skills, his ability to manipulate people, his opponents’ weaknesses, and delay in publishing Lenin’s Testament. All these factors contributed to Stalin’s rapid power and influence gain during the 1920s and can be accounted for his resuming the leadership of communist party. His rise to and maintenance of power were fairly successful given that he did not lose his power until his death.

Bibliography:
Gill, Graeme J. Stalinism. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1998. Print.
"How Many Did Stalin Really Murder?" The Distributed Republic. 01 May 2006. Web. 15 Feb. 2011. .
"Khrushchev's "Secret Speech," 1956." The History Guide -- Main. Web. 20 Feb. 2011. .
Whittock, Martyn J. Stalin's Russia. London: Collins Educational, 1998. Print.

There are many events in history which have entirely changed the world and the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao Zedong, in the Chinese Civil War in 1945-1949 is surely one of them. The end of Chinese Civil War resulted in the establishment of China as a socialist state People’s Republic of China (PRC). China’s previous government, led by Chiang Kai-shek of the Nationalist Party Guomindang (GMD), which was defeated during the civil war was forced to flee to Taiwan. These events had forever changed the face of the Asian history in the 20th century. The most important question is why and how did the communists, who seemed more disadvantageous compared to the nationalists at that time, win the civil war. I believe that the three major factors which resulted in CCP’s victory are more efficient military structure, more moral soldiers, more appealing ideology, and more promising economic policies for the majority of the Chinese population as opposed to those of GMD.

Just like any other war, the winner of the Chinese Civil War was determined mainly by the efficiency of its military force, which CCP forces had proved to be more effective compared to those of the GMD. Since the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, both the nationalist and communist troops had suffered damages. However, the communist troops were not destroyed to the same extent that the nationalist troops were due to less frequent clashes with the Japanese troops and therefore, by 1945, the communist forces had enough strength to wage the civil war against the gradually-weakening nationalist army. Additionally, Mao’s main military strategy was guerilla warfare, which was more geographically appropriate since most of the war was fought in deserted or mountainous areas of China. It was easier for the communists to launch ambush attacks and then disguise as civilians as Mao once said “The people [of China] are like water and the [communist] army is like fish” (Mao Zedong). The communist unit forces were designed to be mobile and flexible, making it easier to deploy in limited time whereas the nationalist divisions, which used conventional warfare, failed to do so. This made it harder to destroy the communist armed forces. Meanwhile, the size of the communist forces was also rapidly growing in this period due to increasing support the Chinese peasants gave them so the communist army was gradually becoming stronger while the nationalist army was gradually becoming weaker due to exhaustion from previous wars, corruption, low-morality of the soldiers, and lack of discipline. Furthermore, the communists had a better inter-division communication than the nationalists did. This resulted in organized military structure, clear and effective decisions, and back up forces at critical moments. On the other hand, the nationalists did not have that kind of teamwork and so they often lost trains full of weapons and supplies to the communists due to lack of support from other divisions. Another major flaw of the nationalists was the decision to concentrate their army forces in urban areas while failing to secure larger rural areas, letting the CCP controlled most areas of China by 1949.

In addition to effective military strategies, another important factor which led to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s victory was that its leaders and soldiers had higher morale, which won more support from grass-root civilians, compared to Guomindang (GMD)’s leaders and soldiers. Unlike the nationalists’ system which was full of corruption, bureaucracy, and hierarchy, the communists’ ranking system relied on the merits and ideology of the members in deciding major positions. At the time, the communists were considered rebels, so it was unlikely that the soldiers joined CCP for the sake of money and wealth. Mao also introduced the idea of ‘codes of conduct’, which was designed to boost morale, for the communist soldiers to follow in order to ensure that peasants were not going to be exploited and taken advantage of. Although better equipped with ammunitions aided by USA than communists were, the nationalist troops lacked the ability and desire to fight, partly because they had suffered from the damages during Second Sino-Japanese War. Looting, plundering, and raping occurred more frequently in areas GMD had occupied due to low morale. The Chinese peasants, who were already living in bad conditions, supported CCP rather than GMD as a result. This gave an advantage for CCP because not only that the peasants admired communists, they also provided useful intelligence about whereabouts and strategies of the nationalists as well as food supplies for the communist forces.

Another advantage of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Chinese Civil War was that the idea of communism was more appealing to majority of the Chinese population due to inequality and bad living conditions at the time. One of the core beliefs of communism was equality through socialism, which was what many Chinese needed since they were unable to support themselves in the GMD’s nationalist capitalism China. CCP also opposed the system of monopoly and unfair land ownership, which were the factors that pushed many Chinese below the poverty line. Furthermore, CCP was against imperialism, dictatorship, and warlordism, which left the peasants exploited during Qing era, Yuan Shikai’s rule, and warlord period respectively. Although China under GMD was considered democratic and although it attempted to follow Sun’s “Three Principles of Nation”, living conditions of grass-root Chinese population did not improve by a significant amount while corruption, hierarchy system, and exploitation still existed. Communism seemed to offer a new hope after decades of suffering for Chinese peasants. The communist propaganda during the Second Sino-Japanese War, which convinced them that CCP fought to protect China, combined with communist soldiers’ morale, which showed that CCP would not exploit them like nationalists did, also contributed to the victory of CCP during the Chinese Civil War.

The last factor which led to CCP’s victory in 1949 was its economic policies, which were probably the most influential in winning massive popularity. During 1945-1949, the Chinese economy faced high inflation since GMD mismanaged its economic policy and decided to print and issue more currency after the Second Sino-Japanese War. GMD also imposed a policy of converting Japanese currency to Chinese currency at a low rate, so people who lived in areas the Japanese once occupied lost their life savings. Value of money decreased and as a result, majority of people’s life savings were lost to the point that many could not afford basic necessities such as food and clothing. GMD had also failed to prioritize agricultural industry but concentrated on urban areas’ industries. These led to confidence-lost in the GMD government and many turned to GMD’s opposition, CCP, for help. CCP used the widespread discontent from GMD’s economic policies to its advantage by promising land and agrarian reforms, taking former landlords to somewhat just trials and distributing lands to peasants in many areas such as Yenan. In my opinion, CCP had successfully convinced majority of the population of the communist ideology and promised a better life for them. This was the as equally important, if not more, as its military strengths which had led CCP to its victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1945-1949. 

Most factors that contributed to CCP’s victory during the Chinese Civil War such as military strength, high soldier morale, appealing ideology, and promising economic policies were inter-related and complimented each other. The CCP won the Chinese Civil War because it had succeeded in using those factors to its advantage, convincing most of the Chinese population that communism was the right approach for China. The Chinese Civil War of 1945-1949 was the start of the People’s Republic of China, which can be considered one of the leading nations in the world.

Bibliography

"Chinese Civil War." A Dictionary of World History. 2000. Encyclopedia.com. 31 Dec. 2010<http://www.encyclopedia.com>.

"China :: Civil War (1945-49) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 31 Dec. 2010. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/111803/China/71834/Civil-war-1945-49>.

"Chinese Civil War." GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information. Web. 31 Dec. 2010. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/chinese-civil-war.htm>.

 "Mao Zedong." Www.kirjasto.sci.fi. Web. 31 Dec. 2010. <http://www.kirjasto.sci.fi/mao.htm>.

"The Causes of the Victory of the Chinese Communist Party." Marxists Internet Archive. Web. 31 Dec. 2010. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/peng/1951/nov/causes.htm>.

Despite various interpretations made and countless debates by historians from different schools of thoughts about the Cold War, most historians appear to agree that Cuba has played a significant role in developing the Cold War, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Even though the Cuban Missile Crisis is the most well-known incident for Cuba’s impact on the Cold War, Cuba had also played a significant role in developing the Cold War during 1963-1989 mainly because it had become a major hindrance of the US containment policy.  After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cuba still played a significant role in developing the Cold War in Latin America, where the Cuban revolution instigated socialist movements, and in Africa, where Cuba supported revolutions militarily.

            Cuba’s significance in developing Cold War did not stop after 1962, but rather continued throughout the 1970s-1980s, particularly in the aspect of socialist movements in Latin America.  I believe that the Cuban socialist revolution strongly influenced the socialist movements in other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and more.  Cuban revolution had apparently inspired many Latino socialist student groups and guerillas because guerilla attacks, urban bombings, and demonstrations were much more frequent compared to before 1959-1962.  This became a major threat to the USA because “In many cases Cuba provided training and material support to guerrillas.” (“History of Latin America”). The tension between democratic capitalism and socialist communism in this period rapidly increased because the US had always been anxious about communism spreading throughout the world because of the domino theory.  Moreover, the groups of people who supported socialism were usually students, activists, and exploited workers who suffered inequality: people who were hard to be repressed by force or law. The socialist movements influenced by the Cuban revolution in Latin America affected the US policy of containment in this region significantly because the US gave a lot of military aid to Latin American governments and also supported “counterguerilla operations” (“History of Latin America”). 

Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of Cuban revolution influencing revolutionary movements in Latin America is the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 led by the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN), which was “further strengthened [due to] Cuban mediation” (“Nicaraguan Revolution 1978-1979).  The Cuban revolution was one of the three major events that had influenced the revolution. Since 1974, Cuba had supported the FSLN by letting escaped Sandinista prisoners into Cuba.  Additionally, Cuba had been providing Nicaragua with military aid, an act which angered the USA.  In 1984, US President Reagan, who regarded Nicaragua as “part of the geo-political quest by international communism”(“US Foreign Policy: Nicaragua and Reagan”), imposed a rather hostile foreign policy, also known as ‘rollback policy’.  He even “initiated illegal, covert programs” (Whitt) in an attempt to overthrow Nicaraguan communist government.  It can be said that the Cuban revolution, which led to several Latin American socialist movements, was one of the reasons Reagan administration felt the need to ‘rollback communism’.    

In addition to the involvement in Latin America, Cuba also played a significant role in Africa, especially in Angola, during the 1970s. Cuba had developed a “pro-Third World” stance and wanted to encourage revolutions and to protect Third World countries from imperialism, in the other words colonization.  In 1975, Castro supported an Angolan leftist movement group MPLA, who believed socialism was the way to bring services for the poor, by providing military aid and 430,000 Cuban troops by the end of 1991. Angolan fighters were funded by Cuba and Soviet Union, an act which angered USA who perceived independence movement in Africa as ‘communism’.  Cuba became one of the major hindrances of the US international policy not only in Latin America, but also in Africa.  It also heightened the Cold War tension in Africa during the 1970s – 1980s.

Apparently, one of the main reasons of Cuban interventions throughout the Cold War is because of the worsened Cuban-Soviet relations after 1962.  Castro was not consulted when Khrushchev and Kennedy negotiated and later withdrew missiles from Cuba.  This angered Castro since Cuba was being treated as a pawn in the superpowers’ game.   He felt that the Kennedy Administration was “solely responsible for the breakdown of the Cuba-Soviet Union relationship.” (BBC News), so Castro usually took stances which opposed US foreign policies.  Other than its pro-Third World and pro-revolution stance which conflicted with the US stance, Cuba seemed to be intentionally taking the opposite stance from the US because Cuba saw USA as its enemy since 1962. 

Even after the Cuban Missile Crisis ended, Cuba still played many major roles during 1963-1989 which contributed to the development of the Cold War. One of the significances of Cuba is its ability to stir up revolutionary and socialist movements in Latin America, an act which directly challenged the US.  It also supported revolutions in African countries politically and militarily.  This is because Cuba was an anti-imperialism country and also because it usually opposed the USA.  In conclusion, I believe the role of Cuba in 1963-1989 was significant in developing the Cold War.      

Citations: 

"BBC ON THIS DAY | 28 | 1962: World Relief as Cuban Missile Crisis Ends." BBC News - Home. N.p., n.d. Web. 08 Nov. 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/28/newsid_2621000/26...>.

"History of Latin America :: Socialism, Communism, Fascism -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia."Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. Web. 02 Nov. 2010. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/331694/Latin-America/60907/Socialis...>.

"Nicaragua Revolution 1978-1979." OnWar.com - Wars, Military History, International Relations. Web. 02 Nov. 2010. <http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/november/nicaragua1978.htm>.

Trento, Angelo. Castro and Cuba: from the Revolution to the Present. Northampton, MA: Interlink, 2005. Print.

"The Cold War - Ideology." Encyclopedia of the New American Nation. Web. 01 Sept. 2010. <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Ideology-The-cold-war.html>.

"U.S. Foreign Policy: Nicaragua and Reagan." The Klar Books Site. Japan Book, Travel Writing from Asia, Information on Japan, Author Samples - plus More! Web. 02 Nov. 2010. <http://klarbooks.com/academic/nicarga3.html>.

Whitt, Preston J. "The Changing Face of Socialism in Latin America." Energy Publisher. 17 Oct. 2010. Web. 2 Nov. 2010. <http://www.energypublisher.com>.

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Kennan, Zubok, and Malia (“The Cold War-Ideology”, 2010) believe that the Cold War was based on different ideologies, democratic capitalism and communism whereas Halle (Wolk, 2010) and Litvinov (“Comments on Maksim M. Litvinov”, 2010) believe that the Cold War was a struggle for empire. Ideological struggle certainly contributed to the origin of the Cold War, but only to a certain extent. The struggle for empire was a major factor that developed the Cold War.  Although the Cold War started out as a conflict between two ideologies, it eventually shifted to a struggle for empire under the symbols of communism and democracy.

            The Russian Revolution in 1917 contributed greatly to the Cold War because it was the establishment of the communist Soviet Union, with a completely different principle from the Western Allies’ democracy and capitalism.  The Allies, particularly USA, perceived this as a threat since Lenin “declared a de facto ideological war on the capitalist ‘bourgeois scum’” (Hughes-Wilson, 2006) and “Long live the worldwide socialist revolution!”(Clark, 1989).  Lenin believed that USSR was encircled by capitalist countries that were ready to attack.  Their opposing ideologies caused deep suspicions and mistrusts, which contributed significantly to the Cold War.

It was clear that there was a shift from a conflict between two ideologies to a conflict between two superpowers, but it might not be clear what the turning point was.  One thing that could be assured was the fact that it started out as an ideology conflict and ended as a power struggle.   According to President Truman, communism was “relies upon …the suppression of personal freedom… it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities.” (“Truman Doctrine”, 2010).

Then, if the Cold War was not about ideology anymore, what was it about then? Dominance of the world. Stalin’s main concern was not about communism, but he wanted to spread the Russian sphere of influence throughout the world. He did this by using the symbol of communism.  Most communist countries, except Yugoslavia, regarded the Soviet Union as the leader of communism, therefore accepting advices, aids, and even commands from the Soviet Union and Stalin. 

Similarly, though not as obviously as the Soviet Union, USA gained dominance in western capitalist countries by implementing Marshall Plan, tagged along with ‘economic advisors’ who ensured that the markets were free and people had ‘freedom’.  Although the ideologies were still present and both sides regarded themselves as ideologists, the Soviets and the Americans were trying to expand their powers and spheres of influence rather than truly defending their ideologies.

Although the Cold War originated from conflicting ideologies, major wars such as Korean War proved that ideologies were just covering USSR’s and USA’s motive: spreading the spheres of influence throughout the world. Korean War was a proxy war between USSR, supporting and ‘giving advices’ to the communist North Korea, and USA, leading UN troops to help capitalist South Korea, rather than a truly ideological war.  Of course, there was still a common theme of communism vs. capitalism and democracy, but it was also geographically important to both superpowers.

South Korea was near Japan, which was considered ‘the American basis of capitalism and democracy in Asia’.  Surely, USA would want to spread its sphere of influence beyond Japan to other parts of Asia.  North Korea, on the other hand, was bordering the east-west Russian border.  Similarly, the Soviet Union would want to take control of the Korean Peninsula through communism, so that it would be no longer ‘encircled by capitalism’, as Stalin had always feared. Ideologies have been used to indicate which side a country was on during the Cold War, but what actually developed the Cold War was the Soviet and American agenda to dominate the world. The Cold War became less about fighting to defend ideologies but more about building empires.

            Vietnam War was another obvious example of how the Cold War had shifted from being a conflict about ideologies to a competition for land and influence.  Anti-Vietnam War protestors felt that Vietnam War was an unnecessary conflict which devastated Vietnam, its neighbors, and USA itself: a failure to ‘contain’ communism.  Furthermore, USA was being criticized for controlling and manipulating South Vietnam, acting no differently from USSR who treated Eastern European countries and other communist countries as puppet states.  USA was so determined to contain communism, in another word USSR, from dominating the world that it did not follow its own ideology of giving ‘freedom’ in order to stop USSR from spreading its sphere of influence.

Perhaps one of the most obvious events that indicated the full extent of a power struggle of the Cold War was the launching of Soviet satellite Sputnik1 in 1957, the origin of the space race.  The Soviets showed the Americans that they were able to defeat them in technology.  Clearly, that had hardly anything to do with communism vs. democratic capitalism, but it was a competition of two superpowers who wanted to dominate not only the world, but also the space through advanced technology and innovation.  During the Kitchen Debate in 1959, Khrushchev declared that “in another 7 years, we’ll be at the level of America, and after that we’ll go farther.”("The Kitchen Debate: Nixon And Khrushchev [1959].", 2010).

            The Cold War was far beyond a conflict between two irreconcilable ideologies.  It started that way and had maintained the ideologies throughout the Cold War, but as the Cold War progressed, it was about spreading the spheres of influence and dominating the world than defending the ideology.  Ideology turned out merely to be symbols which signify both sides of the Cold War, but not playing as a crucial part in the Cold War’s development as it has always been regarded by Kennan, Zubok, and Malia (“The Cold War-Ideology”, 2010).

Citations:

Clark, Ronald W. Lenin: The Man Behind the Mask. London: Faber and Faber, 1989. Print.

"Comments on Maksim M. Litvinov." Redirect to Secure Connection. Web. 06 Sept. 2010. <http://gozips.uakron.edu/~mcarley/Litvinov.htm>.

Hughes-Wilson, John. A Brief History of the Cold War: the Hidden Truth about How Close We Came to Nuclear Conflict. London: Robinson, 2006. Print

"The Kitchen Debate: Nixon And Khrushchev [1959]." Watergate.info - The Scandal That Destroyed President Richard Nixon. Web. 06 Sept. 2010. <http://www.watergate.info/nixon/1959_nixon-khrushchev-kitchen-debate.shtml>.

"Truman Doctrine." Spartacus Educational - Home Page. Web. 06 Sept. 2010. <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAtrumanD.htm>.

"The Cold War - Ideology." Encyclopedia of the New American Nation. Web. 01 Sept. 2010. <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Ideology-The-cold-war.html>.

Wolk, Herman S. "Who Started the Cold War?" Airpower. Web. 1 Sept. 2010. <www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil>.

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I think the causes of the Cold War were…